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Modifications to policymaking processes and actors are crucial when
transitioning to multilevel governance. Civic engagement in budgeting
processes, where crucial policy decisions are determined, is an important
component of shared governance. Understanding the new roles for citizens
in the budget process, then, can extend our knowledge of multilevel
governance. This research explores the ways in which the budget process
incorporates citizen participation to foster an ideal of civil society in the
United States, Brazil, and China. The comparative case analysis probes the
extent to which institutional changes have occurred, why they have
occurred, and the degree to which municipal budget processes are
characterized by multilevel governance.
Key Words: Citizen Participation, Governance, Local Budget Process.
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INTRODUCTION
Contemporary transitions in governance manifest themselves in “interconnected
arenas” featuring diverse actors collaborating on policymaking to leverage
interdependent resources. These transitions represent “reconfiguration of state, market,
and civil society around certain values, processes, and institutions” (Clarke 2007, 58).
Collective academic realization of shifts in governance activities was evident as early as
thirty years ago when Musolf and Seidman (1980) documented the “blurred boundaries”
of public administration. The boundaries of government decision making increasingly
feature third-party (Salamon 1981) and private actors (Kooiman 1993). Scholars around
the world have identified similar causes for these blurring boundaries, including
increased complexity and turbulence in how societal decisions are made, fragmentation
of activities and authority, higher levels of uncertainty and risk, declining capacity of
political and administrative systems, fiscal crisis of the welfare state, market failure,
challenges to the hierarchical model of public management, growing demands for more
accountability and transparency in policymaking, and the impact of globalization (see
e.g., Salamon and Lund 1989; Mayntz 1991; Kjaer 2004; Abramson, Breul, and
Kamensky 2006; Clarke 2007).
The growing interpenetration of what were viewed previously as distinct realms of
action created increased levels of interconnectedness, and shared power arrangements
supplemented, and increasingly supplanted, decision making and administration solely
by public officials (Bryson and Einsweiler 1991, 3–10). The interpenetration of sectors
necessitates conceptual clarity. Governing is now defined as “all those activities of social,
political, and administrative actors that can be seen as purposeful efforts to guide, steer,
control or manage (sectors or facets of) societies” (Kooiman 1993, 2). Governance,
according to Bellamy and Palumbo (2010) is
a move away from traditional hierarchical forms of organization and the adoption
of network forms. It also entails a revision of the relationship between the state and
civil society in a more participatory direction.[…] The state is thus claimed to be
superseded by a “networked polity” where authority is devolved to task-specific
institutions with unlimited jurisdictions and intersecting memberships operating at
sub- and supra-national levels. (As quoted in Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, 21–22.)

One of the most powerful institutional transformations in government that have led to
new patterns of governance has been the concomitant movement of political authority
upward from central governments to international entities and downward to subnational
ones (Fosler 1999). Multilevel governance (MLG) “describes the simultaneous activation
of governmental and nongovernmental actors at various jurisdictional levels” (Piattoni
2010, 159), which is distinctly different from the Westminster model of a centralized,
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unitary state (Cairney 2012, 161). MLG occurs within existing legal frameworks and
institutional arrangements; however instead of state actor dominance, MLG often
features negotiated and interactive decision processes. MLG, as one form of governance,
differs from other forms such as collaborative governance because MLG does not imply
collaboration exists, nor is MLG the same as networked governance, because MLG
emphasizes institutions, whereas network governance refers to the use of an
organizational form different from hierarchies and markets to achieve public purposes
(Politt and Bouckaert 2011, 20).
While the study of the structure of intergovernmental policymaking is a welldeveloped stream of MLG research, a second and equally important stream of research is
necessary to fully understand MLG as represented by evolving relationships between the
state and civil society in a more participatory direction. Thus, our focus is on the nuances
of the relationship between community social capital building and governance.
To understand this emerging form of governance, research needs to consider how
MLG processes provide the capacity necessary to address the complexity of modern
societal problems, while at the same time incorporating market and civil society
organizations into public decision making. Budgeting is the linchpin between popular
sovereignty and public action. As such, budgeting is the fundamental decision-making
process where citizen preferences are translated into governing choices. This research
examines the ways in which the budget process incorporates citizen participation to
foster an ideal of civil society in the United States, Brazil, and China. A meta-analysis of
public documents, scholarly studies, and accounts of the process by participants such as
civil society associations, political parties, and the popular press are utilized as essential
source materials. The analysis probes the extent to which institutional changes have
occurred, why they have occurred, and the degree to which municipal budgets are
characterized by MLG.

Participatory Budgeting: A Framework for Comparative Analysis
Scholars have argued for increased citizen participation in governance over the past
several decades. Participation has been portrayed as a way for individuals to perform
their duties to their community (e.g., Box 1998; King, Stivers et al., 1998) and to
strengthen democracy (Barber 1986). The United Nations Development Programme
encourages governance in which “citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise
their rights, meet their obligations, and mediate their conflicts” Boyte (2005, 536).
Bingham, Nabatchi, and O’Leary (2005, 548) argue that participation enables citizens to
share power. In developing countries, corruption, elitism, and poor service delivery are
frequent, and power may be highly concentrated in the executive branch with little
oversight. “Participation is particularly important because it fosters good governance,
promotes transparency, increases social justice by involving the poor and excluded, and
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helps individuals become better citizens” (Moynihan 2007, 58). It can also curb
clientelism, patronage, and corruption (Shah 2007). The most globally dispersed form of
participatory democracy is participatory budgeting (PB) (Pateman 2012).
Forms of budget participation are extremely diverse. Many municipalities endorse the
principle of representative democracy, where citizens grant their proxy for resource
allocation decisions to elected officials. This transfer of control from the citizens to
public decision makers, however, raises concerns that outcomes overrepresent the
preferences of elected officials and interest groups. Contrasted with this approach to
decision making are municipalities with a budgeting philosophy more supportive of
direct democracy, based on the supposition that citizens ought to participate since they
alone are their own best “representatives.” As Berman (2012) documents, citizens look at
conditions in their community very differently from the way government officials do.
Participatory budgeting can be an opportunity for “educating, engaging, and empowering
citizens and strengthening demand for good governance” (Shah 2007, 1).
Challenges have been noted regarding participatory budgeting efforts. One set of
challenges relates to the areas in which citizens will have input, and who participates.
While in some cases citizen participation may affect the entire operating budget, in other
cases it may relate to capital improvements only or to specific funding allocations that
may be relatively minor (Ebdon 2002). Selecting participants who represent a wide range
of perspectives can avoid selection perceived as cronyism supporting a particular
political agenda (Ebdon and Franklin 2006), but this is not easy. Participation typically
requires time and effort—citizen participants must learn government lingo and rules;
government officials must educate participants, transmit transparent information, educate
participants, and monitor the results.
Other challenges relate to the amount that citizen input can affect budget outcomes
(Franklin and Ebdon 2004), and judging the success of participation (Ebdon and Franklin
2006). The attitude of government officials is crucial (Moynihan 2007). “[I]nformation
sharing and consultation occur more frequently than participation in decision-making or
implementation” (Pateman 2012, 14). Professional administrators may resist citizen
participation in technical and complex areas such as the budget (Thomas 1995), and
officials may believe that more input increases the difficulty of securing their
recommendations (Bland and Rubin 1997). Citizen input in budgeting can create or
exacerbate tensions about resource allocation that may exist between citizens and elected
officials, citizens and fiscal/technical experts, and citizens and interest groups/political
parties. As stated by Arnstein (1969, 216), “There is a critical difference between going
through the empty ritual of participation and having the real power needed to affect the
outcome of the process.” Many methods exist for citizens to participate in budgetary
decision making, yet no one method is ideal and few are institutionalized. Across these
methods, purposes are seldom articulated, expectations vary, and measuring the cost of
participation and the suitability of outcomes is difficult (Ebdon and Franklin 2006).
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Theory building is limited in the area of participatory budgeting, so it is important to
add to our understanding of what facilitates or hampers citizen participation and its
effectiveness. The research that has been done has suggested that there are a number of
variables that are common elements critical in the structure and success of participation
efforts. Based on previous studies, Ebdon and Franklin (2006) identify four key groups
of variables that have been found to make a difference in the effects of participation:
environment, process design, mechanisms used, and goals and outcomes. Environmental
variables include legal structures, social and demographic factors, and political culture.
Design of participatory processes includes areas such as the type of budget allocation,
who participates and how they are selected, and when in the budget process the
participation occurs. Mechanisms may take the form of intensive deliberative methods,
advisory committees, public meetings, and so forth. Goals and outcomes may include
one or more of the following: reduce cynicism, educate participants, gain support for
proposals, gather input for decisions, change resource allocation, enhance trust, and
create a sense of community.
This paper uses the four sets of variables in the Ebdon and Franklin framework to
conduct a comparative case analysis. A meta-analytical approach is the basis for the
multi-country comparison. First-hand accounts of citizen participation in budgeting are
reported from the in-country experiences of the authors. Normative statements and
empirical results that appear in the extant literature provide another source of
scholarly/academic findings from which to triangulate meta-analytic conclusions.
Secondary data is used to embed the native perspective into the analysis. Materials drawn
from publications produced by official government organizations, monographs from
professional associations, statements from civil society organizations, and popular press
reports of participatory processes provide insight into the participants’ experiences. The
evidence from these kinds of “on-the-ground” actors and organizations that have and
regularly do host participatory processes is an essential source of contextual evidence for
the analysis.
The United States, Brazil, and China provide distinctive settings for determining
whether many of the key elements associated with MLG have emerged in each of the
three nations, while also examining whether and how the larger legal, political, and
cultural contexts of each nation have shaped the changes in budget institutions and
processes. The United States is a long-established democracy with broad civil and
political rights as well as an extensive collection of mechanisms, procedures, and
requirements for the inclusion of citizens in the municipal budget process, alongside its
long history of municipal governance reforms. Brazil, of course, is the globally
acknowledged pioneer in PB. Its adoption of PB reflects the nation’s efforts to construct
and operate a fully democratic government after a quarter century of military rule. China
is an authoritarian regime that has liberalized its economy, and more recently is
experimenting with several administrative reforms in an effort to sustain support for the
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current governance pattern. Next, we provide further detail about participatory budgeting
in these environmental contexts.
Participatory Budgeting in U.S. Municipalities
The United States is the world’s third-largest country in landmass and population. At
the federal and state government levels, most elections are partisan, typically featuring
candidates from only two parties—Democratic and Republican. At local levels of
government, many elections are nonpartisan. There are different forms of government at
the local level, with the Mayor-Council (executive), Council-Manager, and Commission
(legislative) forms dominating.
Budgeting systems in the United States are highly decentralized. Roughly 90,000
local governments adopt their own budget. Using 2008 data, the Tax Policy Center
reports that 38 percent of local government revenue comes from inter-governmental
transfers, 28 percent from property taxes, 23 percent from charges and receipts, and the
remainder from sales, income, and other taxes. In general, budget deliberations primarily
focus on general revenue or capital budgets. Some budgeting processes begin with a
planning session of the elected officials. Government staff members use these plans to
prepare and present the budget proposal. In 40 out of 50 states, there are mandates to
make the proposed budget publicly available and/or to hold at least one public hearing
(Berner and Smith 2004, 144–146). States can also require voter referenda to increase
local taxes or issue debt (Ebdon 2000).
Ebdon and Franklin (2006) find that significant factors in the environment in which
local government officials operate to enact the budget include state requirements, form of
government, and political culture. Each of these influences the degree to which citizen
participation activities exist. In addition, characteristics of the residents may predict
participation levels; jurisdictions with larger, heterogeneous, and more highly educated
citizens show a slight increase in participation activities.
The design of participation activities ranges from comprehensive processes like those
in Eugene, Oregon (Simonsen and Robbins 1999), and Midwestern cities (Franklin and
Ebdon 2004), to allocation of a specific fund, such as the Community Development
Block Grant in Vancouver, Washington, or a geographical or capital/infrastructure setaside within the budget in cities like Chicago and New York City.
Many local governments rely on self-selection as the basis for participation rather
than attempting to systematically engage a large number of representative participants.
Self-selection often results in participants who are more self-interested and seldom
provide sincere preferences that weigh competing resource demands, or confirm a
willingness to pay for their preferences.
The choice of participation mechanisms has a significant effect on who participates
(Leighninger 2002; McCoy and Scully 2002; Lukensmeyer and Brigham 2002).
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Mechanisms such as surveys, focus groups, special budget meetings, forums, and
simulations that require allocation tradeoffs and decisions about taxes and spending can
mitigate this (Simonsen and Robbins 2000). Normally only one or two mechanisms are
used and few are institutionalized, with the exception being the public hearing.
The goals and outcomes of participation are wide-ranging; however, there is little
evidence that citizen input changes resource allocation in demonstrable ways in the
United States. Instead, many of the outcomes attributed to citizen participation are more
closely aligned with education, communication, and civic engagement. However, support
for the goals and outcomes associated with participatory budgeting may be gaining
momentum. Three examples support this claim: the Kirkland, Washington, 2012 budget
recommendation included $25,000 to develop a citizen-based budget process; in 2012,
Vallejo, California, leaders gave residents spending authority for $3M in new sales tax
revenue; and Brooklyn College is setting aside 10 percent of the Student Government
Budget (more than $20,000) for students to allocate. The Participatory Budgeting Project
website also reports pilot PB projects in Los Angeles, New Orleans, Baltimore, and New
Haven. Tangible outcomes from these civic engagement activities remain to be seen, but
there is at least the symbolic attempt at public accountability.
The limitations of citizen participation in the United States are well documented
(Ebdon and Franklin 2006). Typically, a few nonrepresentative participants consider only
a small portion of the budget, and few participation mechanisms are institutionalized.
Instead, there is a patchwork of mechanisms used to gather information and little, if any,
accountability for incorporating this input into resource allocation decisions.
Participatory Budgeting in Brazilian Municipios
Brazil, the world’s fifth-largest country in territory (8,514,877 sq km) and in
population (205.72 million), is so vast all of Europe fits inside. Once primitive, the
economy is now the world’s seventh largest (GDP 2.52 trillion, 2011 est.) (CIA World
Factbook). Brazil functions with a federally organized government, and its municipalities
exercise substantial legal autonomy (Motia de Andrade 2004). Although democratic
elections select public officeholders, Brazil remains one of the world’s most
socioeconomically unequal societies, and its political culture is characterized by a
mixture of patron-client networks, mass politics/populist appeals, and growing numbers
of civil society organizations (Roett 2011).
The surprising birth of PB in Brazil has been extensively analyzed, and scholars have
produced a lengthy list of factors associated with PB’s development. Among these causal
factors are municipal experiments with participatory practices during the 1964–1985
military regime era, the growth of voluntary and association activity during the military
regime, a “right to rights” movement against the military regime, declarations in the 1988
Constitution favoring municipal autonomy and increased city revenues, the success of
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leftist parties in local elections, the spread of liberation theology supporting the
participation of the poor in society, and separate national campaigns for improved public
health and for more competent and professional urban government (Souza 2001;
Fernandes 2007; Avritzer 2009; Soares, Krenzinger, and Guindani 2010; Wampler 2011).
PB first emerged in Porto Alegre, the southernmost state government capital. In
addition to the factors listed previously, PB also required human agency in the form of
political leadership, which was provided by the Workers Party (PT), Brazil’s first
effective mass political party. Its 1989 municipal election victory gave PT the chance to
demonstrate its “popular administration” model could work. The local conditions
supporting PB’s genesis were a combination of a favorable political culture in the city,
the establishment of a significantly more democratic legal order in the nation, and the
development of a successful political party committed to radical change in public
administration.
Porto Alegre’s PB has been described in numerous publications, so a concise review
of its essential features will suffice. (For more details, see Abers 2000; Avritzer 2002;
Nylen 2003; Biaocchi 2005; Sintomer and Gret 2005.) PB is a dual-track, multi-tiered set
of citizen assemblies representing regional groupings of neighborhoods that not only
provides opportunities for interest articulation and decision making, but also provides
arenas for the selection of delegates to the next higher level in the process. A region’s
local budget assembly is open to all residents and is the initial location where citizens
may debate and vote on budget priorities, as well as to select two representatives (and
two alternates) to the next level. City officials present attendees with general information
about city finances to assist the deliberations and allocate to each forum a budget quota
proportionate to its population size. The second-tier assemblies are open to all citizens as
observers, but only the elected delegates debate and decide which of the first-level
proposals will become the priority list submitted to the citywide Participatory Budget
Council (COP). The COP combines the preferences of the different regions into a
citywide priority list, negotiates the distribution of funds and projects with the mayor’s
office, and aligns these priorities with the city’s administrative budget format. The COP
also monitors implementation of final budget decisions. Specialists from city
departments may veto specific projects on technical grounds, typically environmental,
financial, legal, or property ones. The council’s expenditure plan goes to the mayor and
municipal council for approval. Thematic assemblies were added to the original budget
process in 1994 to allow citizens to shape policy in five specific areas: urban planning
and development (divided into environment and sanitation, and city planning and
housing); traffic management and public transport; health and social welfare; education,
culture and recreation; and economic development and taxation (Menegat 2002, 187).
Efforts are made to mobilize residents to attend the assemblies and meetings throughout
the yearlong process. The process begins anew when city officials present the previous
year’s accounts and the officials’ investment plans for the upcoming fiscal year to the
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first-level assemblies. Those interested in more details can visit the website of the
Brazilian Network of Participatory Budgeting (Rede Brasileira de Orcamento
Participativo) at www.redeopbrasil.com.br.
Similar to the United States, in Brazil there are many revenue sources that can be
considered during the PB process. It is important to note that PB does not apply to the
whole of a city’s budget; rather PB affects a proportion of the budget that has been
allocated to the PB process. PB funds are typically directed to infrastructure investments,
such as water and sewer lines, street paving, lighting, drainage, health clinics, housing,
and schools. Criteria guide the choice of priorities at each level. For example, final
distribution of funds to districts is a function of the extent of deficiencies in infrastructure
or services, population size, and community priority. More than 200 Brazilian cities now
use PB, and variations in design and process abound. Especially crucial factors affecting
how PB functions are the support of the mayor and the role of civil society organizations
(Wampler 2008).
Just as design and process variations exist, so also does variation in effect. Where PB
is introduced, citizen participation grows over time, and, importantly, participation by
individuals in lower socioeconomic strata increases significantly. Surveys suggest a large
number of participants are members of civil society organizations and unions, and half
are women. Citizens who participated in previous-year assemblies or in thematic
councils are often return participants (Wampler 2012). Many residents of regions
receiving new projects are satisfied with the work and services provided via PB.
Analyses of investment distribution through PB find the poorest regions of cities receive
the highest average investment and/or greatest number of public works projects (Pires
2001; Marquetti 2003). The heightened participation of nonaffluent citizens has led to a
redistribution of public resources to historically neglected neighborhoods. These studies
confirm PB is a governance design that extends participation and influence in city
decision making to formerly excluded groups. Souza (2001, 183) summarizes PB Brazil
by observing “there is no single ‘model’ of PB, but rather a collection of experiences that
have acquired different features.[…] [T]he main strength of the PB […] seems to be the
insertion of marginalized people and communities, albeit a minority of them, into the
political process for the first time.” She also notes that “allowing these citizens the right
to decide (and not only to be heard) may well have a long-term impact on Brazil’s
unequal balance of power.”
The Chinese Approach to Budgeting Participation
China has the world’s largest population and fourth-largest landmass (CIA World
Factbook). About 50,000 subnational governments include provinces, prefectures,
counties, cities, townships, and towns (Rao 2003). A one-party structure parallels
government, with key decisions essentially made by the party. In 1978, China began to
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move from a planned to a market economy. Other reforms have included the beginning
of some electoral competition at the lowest levels, increasing allowance of
nongovernmental organizations, and increased transparency and accountability (Florini et
al. 2012).
Budgeting systems have also changed. The central government determined budget
targets and redistributed revenues for all levels, until the 1978 reforms increased local
autonomy. However, finances were highly fragmented, with little financial management
control until further reform in 1999. Line-item departmental budgets are now required.
The finance bureau is now more central to budgeting, with less fragmentation and
increased legislative review (Ma and Niu 2006). However, implementation has been
uneven: legislatures do not see all departmental budgets (Ma 2009), they may not have
line-item veto authority (Wu and Wang 2011), and they may have only a few days to
review the budget (Lu and Xue 2011).
A 1994 tax-sharing reform created three levels of taxes: central, local, and shared.
Local governments are highly dependent on the shared taxes, primarily the business,
value-added, and enterprise income taxes, over which they have little autonomy (Shen,
Jin, and Zou 2006). Revenues are insufficient for expenditure demands, creating
incentives to use fees and charges that are outside the budget (Ahmad, Singh, and
Fortuna 2004). Land sales have become a significant source of income, estimated at as
much as 40 percent of 2010 local revenues (Soh and Wang 2011).
A 2007 freedom-of-information rule has led to increasing public knowledge of
budgets. Budgets are being disclosed publicly “where such information had earlier been
deemed to be a state secret” (Florini et al. 2012, 140). Citizen-participation experiments
are a recent step in budget reform. He (2011) views these efforts as attempts to reduce
corruption and improve administrative efficiency, and notes that moving to an economy
based on taxation has also increased the impetus for citizen participation, as taxpayers
demand budget transparency. Individual governmental and party leaders, as well as
academics and research organizations, have also been influential in initiating these
experiments (Gao and Guo 2012).
Participatory budgeting was initially piloted in 2005 in several localities, only one of
which has used participation continuously since then (Wu and Wang 2011). There are
few examples at higher levels, but participation has become more frequent in villages
(He 2011). Variation exists in the types of participatory decision, the timing, and how
citizens are selected. In rare cases, citizens may discuss the entire government budget
during the legislative review process. Participation more commonly occurs during budget
preparation, and focuses on prioritizing specific capital projects. These projects are
typically then included in the budget (Niu 2011). The town of Zeguo has experimented
with deliberative polling, sometimes related to infrastructure choices, but other times
regarding the total budget (He 2011). Government officials usually choose several dozen
participants, either through methods such as random sampling, or through selection.
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Participation may take one or more days of meetings and deliberation, and financial
grants may be used as incentive (He 2011).
In a case study of participatory budgeting in the city of Wuxi, Wu and Wang (2011)
found that motivating factors included party leadership support, research foundation
assistance, a culture of participation with numerous civil society organizations, and fiscal
strength. Mass media help to encourage and educate participants, and surveys and
neighborhood recommendations are collected prior to voting. Citizens monitor
construction in their neighborhoods and participate in project evaluation. There was
some dissatisfaction, though, because the government determines the participants, the
funding level, and the projects that will be considered.
Other scholars have noted these limitations (He 2011; Niu 2011; Ma 2009). In
addition, participation typically involves only a small portion of the budget. Also, budget
transparency is still new, and even legislators have limited knowledge and voice. And
China remains a one-party system with largely uncompetitive elections (He 2011).
Finally, diffusion of participatory budgeting has been slow, and has depended on
“political entrepreneurs” in the places it has been used (Ma 2009). Local officials are also
rotated frequently (Chou), which reduces the potential for institutionalizing participation.
Yuan (2012) concludes that the desire to maintain party and government control will
prevent expansion of participation beyond the township or lower levels.
However, some remain hopeful. Niu (2011, 47) concludes, “[P]articipatory budgeting
has become a promising approach to create a deliberative dialogue between the
government and citizens.” And He notes that while power structures have not changed,
“In China, PB experiments have promoted a degree of transparency and fairness,
provided opportunities for deputies and citizens to examine, discuss and monitor budgets
and improved the communication between government and citizens” (He 2011, 131).

Comparison of Participatory Budgeting Across the Three Countries
The cases of the United States, Brazil, and China provide a rich source of material for
analyzing the status of citizen participation in budgeting in a variety of institutional
governance contexts. In this section, we comparatively analyze evidence from the three
cases to discern the degree to which the role of the state is evolving as patterns of
interaction between the state and society shift within the realm of resource allocation.
Table 1 displays key characteristics of each of the three cases on the four-dimension
analytical framework of Ebdon and Franklin (2006).
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Table 1. Evidence from the Three Cases
USA

Brazil

China

Environment:
Legal

Cities are state political
subdivisions with taxing
limits and often mandated
disclosure and public
hearings. Some states
allow home-rule charters

Constitutional changes,
legal autonomy for
municipalities,
re-instatement of local
elections

Social

Large numbers of
neighborhood groups,
unions and nonprofit
organizations

Large socioeconomic
Recent growth in civic
disparity, active (and
associations
growing) number of civil
society organizations, call
for right to rights.”

Political

Two major parties,
competitive elections,
local often nonpartisan

Multiparty system,
contested democratic
elections, mix of patronclient networks, mass
politics/populist appeals,
and civil society
organizations

Type of funds

Intergovernmental
transfers, property tax,
and charges constitute
89% of revenues; IGR
and charges not usually
focus of PB

Self-generated revenues
Shared taxes, local taxes,
19%; state-local shared
land sales, borrowing
taxes 25%; federal-local
shared taxes 19%, social
policy net transfers 16%;
PB funds drawn principally
from city taxes and fees.

Scope of
decisions/input

Varies (operating, capital, Prioritization of new public Primarily prioritization of
specific funding
infrastructure investments, pre-selected capital
allocations)
5%–50% of the budget
projects

Participant
selection

Varies widely, often selfselected

Multi-tiered plenary
assemblies open to all
residents; budget and
policy theme tracks

Kinds of
participants

Typically self-selected,
non-representative, and
small % of population

2–3 per 1000 population; Typically small
nearly half are female and
working class or poor

Budgets were secret until
recently, little legal role for
citizens

One party, mostly noncompetitive elections;
mostly used in small
communities

Process:

Typically selected by
government officials; some
sampling
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Timing

Varies (budget
preparation, during
legislative review)

Year-long, starting with
Usually during budget
budget deliberation,
preparation
including implementation
monitoring

Mechanisms:

Varies (workshops, focus
groups, simulations,
surveys, hearings)

Assemblies; councils;
neighborhood meetings;
polling; district tours

Goals
(Motivation):

Education, gain support,
build trust, community,
input for difficult budgetbalancing decisions

Re-democratization; attain Transition to market
group/ neighborhood
economy and taxes ;
interests; inclusiveness;
administrative reforms
political gain by officials
and parties

Effect often unclear;
Outcomes
(Accountability, useful for education and
Transparency): possibly trust; lack of
institutionalization

Participation and venues
growing over time;
increased investment in
poorer neighborhoods
and influence of
marginalized citizens

Varies (one- to two-day
workshops; deliberative
polling)

Decisions limited but are
used in budgets; little
diffusion/
institutionalization yet

Analyzing the Environmental Dimension
It may seem obvious that changes in the legal framework are necessary, but without
changes in constitutional provisions or statutory law, it is difficult for citizen participation
to flourish. Further, guaranteed access to budget documents and transparent information
needs to be provided. In addition, although not explicitly part of the Ebdon and Franklin
framework, local government budget decisions need to be immune from override by
higher levels of government. Just because the right to participate is created, does not
mean that it will be utilized. While the right to participate is an important foundation of
citizen participation, participation requires action and organization. Without the existence
of large numbers of civil society organizations that actively mobilize their members to
express their preferences in the policy process, government officials will dominate
budgeting decisions. The United States is home to a large number of active civil society
organizations, and is also characterized by legal provisions supportive of citizen
participation and budget transparency. State governments, it must be noted, do impose
varying levels of constraint on municipal budgeting in the form of tax and expenditure
limitations and other revenue-base restrictions. Brazilian civil society organizations are
primarily a post-WWII phenomenon, while the legal provisions and local fiscal
autonomy date from 1988. China by contrast is in the initial stages of changing the

134

Multilevel Governance Processes – Citizens & Local Budgeting:
Comparing Brazil, China, & the United States

Vol. 18, No. 1

formal rules of budgeting, including public access to information and increased local
autonomy, and is also in a period of gestation of civil society organizations.
If the individuals who hold formal elected positions are opposed or neutral to citizen
participation, the likelihood is that it will be difficult for even active citizen groups to
participate effectively in the budget process. In local political systems with partisan
elections, the position of political parties for or against citizen participation will also
influence the possibility of participation. Furthermore, the way in which nonpartisan or
partisan officials view the budget process—as a fully participatory activity, a
representative democratic activity, or primarily an executive-managerial activity—will
also affect the chances for participation. The political system, and in particular the
principles and ideological view of officials, can have an effect. In the United States,
despite reforms such as the use of initiatives and referenda, budgeting has primarily been
perceived as more of an executive, technical/managerial activity with many state-level
legal restrictions on revenue generation, expenditure controls, and financial auditing and
reporting, but few mandates for citizen engagement beyond an obligatory public hearing
(Krane, Rigos, and Hill 2001). In Brazil, on the other hand, the PT held that citizens were
not only capable, but ought to be involved in the budget process. In China, the recent
movement has been from secretive, party-controlled budget decisions to a more rational
technical process, as well as a process with modest citizen input; nevertheless, the
absence of competitive elections means that the party remains the dominant actor.
Analyzing the Process Dimension
Within the process dimension, three factors are considered to be important to the
success of participatory budgeting: what is being allocated, who participates, and the
timing of participation in the budget cycle. Multilevel governance would be suggested
when 1) input on allocation preferences is about resources that have tangible impacts on
the participants’ lives as members of the community, 2) participants represent the major
interests in the community, and 3) the timing is early enough in the budget cycle to
positively allocate resources toward attainment of shared community goals. Not
surprisingly, on the process dimension, there is wide variation in the degree to which
multilevel governance between actors is occurring.
Across the three cases, we see diversity in the funding sources available to
government. Legal restrictions on the sources and uses of funds can come from many
levels of government. The degree of autonomy held by local government officials can
impact PB processes. One commonality across the three cases is that the resourceallocation decisions for which citizens are invited to provide input is usually limited to
discretionary funds and infrastructure development (capital) projects. Admittedly, there is
great diversity across and within the countries; however, another common element is that
the citizens generally provide input on the allocation of a very small percentage of the

April 2013

Aimee Franklin, Dale Krane, & Carol Ebdon

135

total budget. Further, selection is often constrained to a limited list of projects. One
process feature that differentiates the cases is the point at which the list of projects is
compiled. In the purest form of participatory budgeting, citizens can play a more direct
role in identifying potential projects and then reducing the list based on jointly developed
parameters. In the United States, there are more examples of the development of
scenarios/simulations that solicit input on a more comprehensive portion of the budget.
Overall, though, the efforts in all three countries are not ideal in terms of the amount or
types of funds being allocated , but a commonality is to seek preferences for
infrastructure projects that have tangible impacts on all local residents. Many items
funded in the operating budget, by comparison, do not uniformly apply to residents of a
city since they often feature exclusion criteria.
Who participates is the process dimension factor with the widest variation across
cases—examples being self-selection, handpicked or random or purposive selection, and
leverage representation. Each selection strategy can become problematic unless
government can assure that those who provide input will faithfully represent the diversity
of preferences in the community. Self-selected actors and handpicked actors can be
expected to prefer allocations that benefit them directly or indirectly (by currying party
favor). On the other hand, citizen-selected actors would not reasonably be expected to
differ from elected officials in Brazil, since local government elections already feature a
slate of candidates with a range of governance ideologies. Random selection of
participants is an interesting approach since, from a mathematical theory perspective, it
offers the highest probability of including a set of participants who are truly
representative of the populace. However, this presumes the ability (interest) to conduct a
selection process that is truly random. But, in the case of China, where elected officials
are not competitively selected, we conclude that it offers the highest likelihood of
selection of a diverse group of participants. Overcoming the tendency for self-interested
action remains a challenge.
In terms of timing, there are also significant differences. The budget process includes
four phases: preparation, adoption, execution, and evaluation. Local governments in all
nations that seek input at the time of budget preparation seem to enhance the likelihood
that preferences will result in community goal attainment. There are mixed efforts in the
United States; historically, input has been primarily during the phase where the budget is
reviewed and adopted by the legislature. This is changing in some local governments. In
Brazil and China, participation is growing across all four phases of the budget process.
Analyzing the Participatory Mechanism Dimension
There is no preferred mechanism or group of mechanisms to assure that multilevel
governance activities result in a networked polity. Wide variety exists in the methods of
interaction between citizens and government officials. Some of these are traditional, face-
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to-face interactions, while other methods are versions of applied social science
technologies. Local governments in the United States offer the widest range of
participation mechanisms and, typically, consistently offer at least one (public hearing)
and often two mechanisms for citizens to offer input. Brazil and China utilize
participatory mechanisms to elicit citizen preferences and make decisions about new
public investments. However, fostering participation within the multilevel governance
framework incurs more costs than traditional governing. These costs include time on the
part of both citizens and government officials. For example, PB is a year-long process in
Brazil involving multiple meetings. China has often included outside experts such as
university faculty. Operational costs are also incurred. In Brazil and China, decisions
made in the public assemblies are typically adopted as part of the budget. In the U.S., by
contrast, expressed citizen preferences do not always result in budgetary changes.
Analyzing the Goal/Outcome Dimensions
The International Association for Public Participation’s Spectrum of Public
Participation arranges five public participation goals on a continuum—Inform, Consult,
Involve, Collaborate, Empower—suggesting increasing levels of public impact.
Multilevel governance would seek to include all of these goals in budgeting processes.
The case evidence suggests at least a symbolic desire to achieve all five of the
participation goals in the three countries in this study, but with varying levels of attention.
The articulated goals in Brazil seem to reach the highest level on the continuum—
empowerment—and offer the best evidence of attaining this outcome, although at a
minimal level, but with an improvement trajectory. In the United States, the majority of
local governments strive for participation goals of inform and consult. A very small
minority actively practice public involvement, but typically not in a representative or
consistent fashion. Public officials in China have not publicly stated participation goals
as such, referring instead to the desire to transition to a market economy with taxation.
However, in practice their activities have achieved increased levels of
informing/educating and collaborating, with low- to nonexistent levels of consulting,
involving, and empowering.
From a normative perspective, the return on investment for participatory budgeting
outcomes is problematic. Each of the three nations devotes significant public resources to
its participatory activities, and the tangible outcomes in terms of citizen-driven resource
allocation are nominal by any measure. However, the civil society outcomes, intangible
though they are, seem to be demonstrable and on the rise—more citizens are
participating, and diverse representation, as a result, is increasing. Intractable questions
exist, though, when one considers the likelihood of PB institutionalization or
maintenance of positive participation trajectories.
What can be learned from the experiences of these three countries to strengthen the
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trajectory toward multilevel governance via enhanced civic engagement activities? The
review of these three cases reveals, not surprisingly given the degree of contextual
differences, a substantial amount of variation in process and outcome. A supportive
environment is essential, and often institutionalization only occurs through
legal/administrative reforms, many of which devolve control to local government to
encourage the development of a networked polity. There is no “magic” process, as
evidenced in the degree of variation concerning the type of funds and percentage of
overall budget that are allocated through PB; however, those that engage larger numbers
of participants who represent the geographic area where the public resources are being
allocated are preferred. While all three countries exhibit some degree of commitment to
the five goals of participation, there is divergence in the results achieved. Changes in
technological capabilities and the diffusion of best practices have increased transparency
and encouraged the use of forced-choice simulations and/or polling. Differences in
environment, processes, goals, and outcomes provide empirical evidence upon which to
build models of multilevel governance that recognize how interdependence can facilitate
the building of social capital necessary for optimally functioning civil societies.

CONCLUSION
This comparative analysis suggests three necessary contextual conditions for effective
multilevel governance (MLG) via participatory budgeting (PB): (1) legal guarantees,
including citizen participation, municipal autonomy, and access to budget documents; (2)
active civil society organizations capable of mobilizing participation in budget processes;
and (3) a commitment to shared decision making. Combined, these three factors enhance
the development of MLG-style policymaking that incorporates citizens into decisions
about the allocation and distribution of resources within communities. While this
conclusion is limited to the three countries studied, nevertheless the findings are
consistent with previous research in other nations (e.g., Shah 2007).
Ebdon and Franklin’s framework (2006) provides a useful analytical tool for
comparative case analysis; however, the results from this analysis suggest that it should
be extended to incorporate the additional factors uncovered by this analysis. Legal
guarantees of municipal autonomy are important, but so also is fiscal autonomy.
Historically, local governments have not possessed significant independent revenue
bases; transfers from superior levels of government usually come with conditions that
restrict the scope of local budgetary decisions. Simply put, fiscal dependence can trump
legal independence. Additionally, policy decisions by superior levels of government can
impose additional constraints on actors involved in local decision making. Finally,
business cycles and community wealth influence PB. In at least the United States, budget
participation appears to be more common in times of fiscal stress, when decisions are
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more difficult. The citizen-participation framework, therefore, should be modified to
include factors related to fiscal autonomy.
Analysis of these countries also suggests that attention to the mobilization process for
“new” actors is another stream related to successful multilevel governance. To achieve a
networked polity, the Bellamy and Palumbo (2010) question of “who governs” has a flip
side—“who participates” when institutional multilevel governance is valued?
Participatory budgeting processes wrestle with how to balance the control of government
officials with citizen empowerment and civil society goals. Various techniques have been
used to incorporate a diversity of actors while constraining personal and partisan interests
to protect the public interest.
In a multilevel governance environment, the case for participatory budgeting rests on
its reputed outcome: citizens gain real influence in the policy process. However,
inclusion can create tensions between citizens and government officials—elected
officials can view it as undercutting their role and responsibilities as representatives of
the people. Tensions also are created between citizens and “technocrats” in the budget
office. Likewise, PB can exacerbate the jockeying among executive, legislative, and
administrative officials not only at the local level, but also between officials at different
levels of government. Analytical frameworks need to consider the relationship between
goals and outcomes in an environment of shared decision making by actors with
differing motivations and incentives.
The transition to multilevel governance entails the development of new institutional
designs. Fundamentally, the choice to initiate participatory budgeting is an effort to graft
direct democracy onto the structures and procedures of representative democracy. While
more costly and difficult to implement than conventional forms, participatory budgeting
institutionalizes a form of governance that incorporates citizens from hard-to-mobilize
social strata and creates a real opportunity for them to influence public action for their
benefit (Smith 2009, 68–69). Doing so requires significant change in existing patterns of
governance and necessitates finding acceptable balances among popular preferences,
technical dimensions of budget choices, and requirements imposed by superior levels of
government, including supranational ones. The cases suggest that these balances are
pursued dramatically differently from jurisdiction to jurisdiction through permutations of
a networked polity featuring engaged citizens. Analysis of the interactions among public
and private participants in participatory budgeting is a necessary next step in
understanding the transition to multilevel governance.
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